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COMMENTARIES ON THE PUBLIC ACTS OF
INDIANA, 1927-I1. THE ADVERSE
POSSESSION ACT
G. A.

FARABAUGH AND WALTER

R.

ARNOLD*

Squatter rights and squatter tactics in the northwestern part
of Indiana provoked a united endeavour on the part of assemblymen from that region, during the session of the Legislature of
1927, to halt the pernicious effect of one person holding color of
title and consistently paying taxes and special assessments on
land, while another enjoyed the usufruct and, eventually, became
seized with title through adverse possession. The authors of
the law which was conceived to combat this situation, however,
reckoned little with the consequences of a general adverse possession statute and its effect on conditions and cases to which it
was never intended to apply. Chapter 42 of the Acts (Acts of
Indiana 1927, p. 119) again demonstrates the danger of legislation designed to meet some local or specific condition but not
carefully scrutinized, before enactment, for possible application
to the state at large and to circumstances wholly unrelated to
the vice to be corrected, or the special remedy to be granted. It
reads as follows:
"SECTION

1.

Be it enacted by the general assembly of the State of

Indiana, that hereafter in any suit to establish title to lands or real estate
no possession thereof shall be deemed adverse to the owner in such manner
as to establish title or rights in and to such land or real estate unless such
adverse possessor or claimant shall have paid and discharged all taxes and
special assessments of every nature falling due on such land or real estate
during the period he claims to have possessed the same adversely: provided, however, That nothing in this act shall relieve any adverse possessor
or claimant from proving all the elements of title by adverse possession
now required by law."

We shall allocate, under five divisions, the questions patently
arising on construction and application of the act: 1. Its constitutionality; 2. Its effect on the squatter; 3. Its effect on
line encroachments and errors of survey; 4. Its effect on easements; and, 5. Its adjectival effect in proceedings.
* See biographical notes, p. 121.
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ADVERSE POSSESSION ACT

I
ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY
In Indiana, as in practically all other states of the Union, the
adverse possessor's rights are acquired under a statute of limitation.1 After twenty years from the date of accrual thereof,
no action shall be commenced for the recovery of real estate.
But there is a marked distinction to be noted from the effect of
the operation of the statute running as against actions for the
recovery of the possession of real estate as differentiated from
the usual bar of the statute in other actions: While in the latter
instances the effect is merely to give the plaintiff no remedy
when the statute is pleaded, 2 in the former case the bar operates
to vest the defendant with title as against plaintiff. 3 When the
bar of the statute has run, a grant to the adverse possessor is
presumed, 4 and results in extinguishing the title of the true
owner, as effectively as if there had been a grant. 5
But statutes of limitations are creatures of the legislature.
Without legislation they do not exist, and, in the absence of express constitutional inhibitions, the legislature is at liberty to
amend or repeal statutes of limitations, so long as no vested right
is affected.G This latter exception is important to bear in mind
in construing the operation of the act, under review, for, whenever a statute can possibly be so construed as to render it constitutional, courts will resort to such construction even if it be a
strained one.7 That title to real estate which has been acquired
by adverse possession for the statutory period cannot be constitutionally affected by a change in the statute after the period has
run, is well settled.8 Hence, we are warranted in assuming,
without further analysis, that the Act does not and cannot affect
rights which had fully ripened into title before the act was
1 Sec. 302 Burns Stat. 1926, Sub. Div. Sixth.
2 Cassell v. Lowry, 164 Ind. 1; Terry v. Davenport, 185 Ind. 561.
3 Ridgway v. Ludlow, 58 Ind. 248; Roots v. Beck, 109 Ind. 472; Branson
v. Studebaker, 133 Ind. 147.
4 Brown v. Preston, 48 Ind. 367; Brown v. Anderson, 90 Ind. 93.
5 Moore v. Hinkle, 151 Ind. 343.
6 Hubble v. Berry, 180 Ind. 513; MeKinney v. Springer, 8 Blackf. 506;
Stepp v. Brown, 2 Ind. 647.
7 Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Clare.v. State, 68 Ind. 17; Hovey v. State
ex reL, 119 Ind. 395; P. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hartford City, 170 Ind.
674.
8 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Wooster et al., 177 N. W. 740. Certiorari denied
41 S. Ct. 323, 255 U. S. 569, 65 L. Ed. 790.
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passed notwithstanding no legal proceedings were taken to establish it, because once title has ripened, nothing further by way
of proceedings is necessary to fortify the vested right against
aggression. 9 We are also brought to the conclusion that the
act is constitutional because the statute is readily susceptible to
a construction which excludes from its operation rights and interests vested before the statute became operative.
II
ITS EFFEcT ON THE SQUATTER
The careless phraseology employed by the author of this bill,
and the apparent disregard or ignorance of the principles of law
stated above and constituting the genesis of title by adverse possession, engenders dubiety of the efficacy of the statute to accomplish the purposes intended by it. The usual mechanics of bringing the question into forensic play, seems to have been lost sight
of. While many actions to quiet title are brought by the adverse
possessor against the former title-holder, whose title has been
extinguished in the manner above suggested, it has been observed
that such action is not necessary to vest title in the possessor.
Faced with this statute, it is not likely that any such squatter
will ever attempt the aggressive-but will rest on the defensive
side of the question. Assuming his continued actual or constructive possession at the time, an action in ejectment is brought
by the record holder of the title, the defendant merely files an
affirmative answer setting up that "the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue within twenty years next preceding the filing
of his complaint herein," (though not necessary to plead the
statute specially).98 The plaintiff would either demur on account
of defendant's failure to set up compliance with this statute in
his plea of the limitations, or would reply with a negative-that
defendants did not pay the taxes and special assessments for
the unexpired period of the limitations after enactment of the
statute.
Let us speculate on the probable sequence of events after either
plea: On plaintiff's demurrer, or on defendant's demurrer to
plaintiff's reply, plaintiff argues that a condition precedent to
defendant's standing in court, with his answer of limitation as
9 Rennert v Shirk et al., 163 Ind. 542.
9a Sec. 1131 Burns 1926; Watson v. Lecklider, 147 Ind. 395; Craven v.
Craven, 181 Ind. 56&
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a defense in bar to the action, is, that defendant have "paid and
discharged all taxes and special assessments of every nature
falling due on such land or real estate during the period he claims
to have possessed the same adversely." Defendant counters,
however, that the statute only requires such payment on his part
if he defendant, seeks "to establish title or rights in and to such
land or real estate"; that he is not in the action attempting to
establish any right, but merely resisting an assault upon his possession of the premises which he, by his answer, admits he has
held and holds, but that plaintiff cannot enforce his (plaintiff's)
rights against defendant, because the former has too long slept
on his, (plaintiff's) rights; that defendant's right or title to the
land is not in controversy. In effect, defendant, by the special
plea is admitting plaintiff's cause of action, but avoiding it per
force the statute of limitation. Defendant is not asserting a
right, but an affirmative defense, and it is axiomatic that one
who seeks to prevail in an action in ejectment must prevail, if
at all, on the strength of his own right or title, not on the weakness of the defendant's "right or title."10
Another difficuly looms in the offing against the plaintiff in
the supposed case: the statute limits the operation of the act to
suits "to establish title to lands or real estate" (sic). An action
in ejectment is essentially not a suit "to establish title," though
one of the consequences may be that, having judicially determined the right to possession, the nature of the case will effectually settle the title. An act of this character, which is derogatory of statutes of repose, will receive a strict construction. 1
Ergo, is it unreasonable to contend that the "suit" in which
the statute shall have force, must be one to quiet title to real
estate or an action of that nature?
However, resort to an action to quiet the title to real estate
is barred fifteen years after the action accrues.' 2 And not only
may that constitute an insuperable impediment in some cases,
but in those where the fifteen year statute has not run at the
time of going into effect of the statute, can the plaintiff avail
himself of the statute? The statute says that possession shall
not be "deemed adverse to the owner," unless, etc. If the twenty
year statute has run, even though through a part or the whole
of it (after the going into effect of the act) the adverse pos10 Welborn v. Kimmerling, 46 Ind. App. 98.

11 Ellis v. Kenyon, 25 Ind. 134.
12 Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78; Armtrong v. Hufty, 156 Ind.
606; Moore v. Ross, 139 Ind. 200.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

sessor did not pay the taxes and special assessments, can it be
said that the holder of the record title, as against the adverse
possessor is "the owner?"
These and a multitude of other questions suggest themselves
and will be pressed with vigor and persistency until our courts
of review have settled what the legislature could have very
simply settled by an amendment to Section 309 Burns R. S.
1926, so as to make the section read as follows:
"If any person, liable to an action, shall conceal the fact from the
knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced at
any time within the period of limitation after the discovery of the cause of
action; and in all actions for the possession of real estate or'to quiet the
title thereto, no period of adverse possession shall be reckoned in favor of
either party who has not paid the taxes and special assessments falling due
on such real estate, provided, this section shall not affect easements by
prescription or encroachments over boundary lines or errors of survey
acquiesced in or undisturbed for a period in excess of twenty years."

III
ITS EFFECT ON LINE ENCROACHMENTS AND ERRORS OF SURVEY

We now enter upon a study of a phase of the statute that the
legislature never took into consideration, although it affects
millions of dollars worth of property in this State, particularly
in the larger cities. Thousands of large and expensive buildings
in Indiana are standing today some two-, some three-, some
five-inches, some one-, two-, and, in rare cases, three feet over
onto the property of the neighbor. In many cases they have
not stood so for a full period of twenty years. The more valuable the land, the more likely the owner is to get every inch
he owns. In this zeal to leave no part without the pale of the
structure to be erected, an incompetent surveyor--or a compe.
tent surveyor obtaining an erroneous starting point-in 1908
extends Lot 35 two inches into lot 36. The owner of lot 35 has
always been assessed for land of that description as shown on
the recorded plat. When he completed his improvement of, say,
a ten-story building, the entire building was valued as on lot
35, and no part of lot 36 was ever assessed against him; nor
has any part of the value of the building been assessed against
the owner of lot 36. The owner of lot 36, oblivious of the fact
of the encroachment, in 1958 undertakes an improvement on
his land. A careful survey discloses the building on lot 35 to
encroach two inches on lot 36. Now, if the statute is free from
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the objections we have urged under the last head, the owner of
lot 35 may be obliged to move his building even though it has
stood there openly, notoriously, and under claim of right for
fifty years! In all liklihood, in such a case, the court would
be strongly inclined to lay hold of the defects herein pointed
out to defeat recovery by the plaintiff, but suppose the reviewing courts had already construed the statute (in a squatter
case) as meaning that irrespective of whether the question of
adverse possession comes into the case as a defense under the
statute of limitations or to support a cause of action, the period
of non-payment of taxes and special assessments by the adverse
possessor on the locus in quo shall not be reckoned in computing
the period of limitations? It would be difficult to escape the
effect of such a decision.
Then there is another enigma to solve in practice, regardless
of the scope judicial construction may give to the statute. Lands
of some thirty different civic, public, and charitable organizations are exempt from taxation. 13 The authors of this article
are presently interested in a case where lands were dedicated
to a cemetery association in December 1907. Such lands, of
course, are tax exempt. No improvements warranting special
assessments have ever been made. At the time the cemetery
association obtained the grant to the land, it immediately erected a fence on what it supposed to be the boundary line. As a
matter of fact the fence extended fifteen feet over onto another's farm lands. Since then a few graves have been established which extend over onto the encroachment some few
inches. The adjoining owner brought an action in ejectment
in June, 1928. According to the tax records the acreage assessed against, and paid by the plaintiff, includes the strip on
which the association encroaches.
If the statute of adverse possession is available to the plaintiff as replication to the statute of limitations, must it be construed as amending the statute exempting lands of cemeteries
from taxation insofar as such lands have been acquired by
adverse possession? Suppose the tables were turned: suppose
the plaintiff held fifteen feet of land adversely as against the
cemetery which, according to the tax records, is not assessed
for taxation because shown as being cemetery ground? It is
obvious that the defendant could not resist plaintiff's perfection of title thereto for failure to pay taxes, because there were
13

Sec's 14037-14046 Burns' R. S. 1926.
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no "taxes and special assessments * * * falling due on
such land or real estate during the periods he claims to have
possessed the same adversely." In that event, if the cemetery
association is -precluded, "What is sauce for the goose" is not
always "gravy for the gander." The law would work unequally.

IV
ITS EFFECT ON EASEMENTS
The statute, ex proprio vigore, embraces easements by this
language: "title or rights in and to such land." An easement,
14
whether obtained by prescription or grant, is a right in land.
The most common easement, and, perhaps, considered in the
aggregate, the most valuable, are easements of way, many of
which are acquired by oral agreement (and often by writing
which is never recorded) between adjoining owners, only years
later to have a successor in title of one or the other seek their
nullification. The statute of limitation, with its attendant presumption of a grant when applied to real estate, was designed
to meet just such a situation-when the original owners are
dead or beyond reach to establish the agreement. Now, when
one acquires a right of way over another's land, whether by
grant or oral agreement, it is the unique case for the dominant
tenant to pay the taxes on the particular easement strip. Furthermore, such easements are often used in common by both
servient-and dominant tenants. Therefore, if the scope accorded to this statute by construction is to cover both defensive
-and offensive sides of a case, practically no easement can be
established or enjoyed against the servient tenant unless either,
(a), a grant in writing is made and of record; or, (b), a grant
in writing is procurable as evidence; or, (c), the easement has,
In some manner, been severed for tax purposes from the rest
of the servient estate and taxed in the name of the dominant
tenant; for how otherwise would the dominant tenant ever have
an opportunity to pay.the taxes, however willing he might be
to do so?
14 Indianapolis Southern Railway Co. v. Wycoff, 51 Ind. App. 159 (161).
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V
ITS ADJECTIVAL EFFECT IN PROCEEDINGS

We have intentionally avoided expressing an opinion on the
questions of construction suggested in the several preceding
divisions, to the end that before we utter our judgment, some
possible operations of the statute might be envisaged. We are
emboldened to suggest, after this brief survey, that the disinterested lawyer (a role we cannot fulfill now) and impartial
jurist, working only for the greatest good to the greatest number, would conclude that a construction that limited the act to
the very narrowest scope, would be the construction that should
prevail. If such is the conclusion, then adjectivally considered,
the statute is available only as a defense-where the adverse
possessor (either by complaint or cross-action) takes the initiative-unless possibly in some proceedings which may be
instituted under the new Declaratory Judgments Act.
If the statute is confined in its operation as last suggested, it
may be administered without irreparable injury, to any party.
While it will not accomplish against the squatter's unconscionable conduct what the interested legislators intended, it will hold
them in status quo until a succeeding legislature can cure the
defects by a proper amendment or by a new act.
Thus we again learn the wisdom of the watchword to the
fellow who wants to squeeze through hurriedly a bill to cure
this-or remedy that-or prevent such and such an evil:
"analysis and cautious contemplation avoid paralysis by hasty
legislation."
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